Portland State University

PDXScholar
Civil and Environmental Engineering Faculty
Publications and Presentations

Civil and Environmental Engineering

8-1-2007

Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems
Miguel Andres Figliozzi
Portland State University

Hani S. Mahmassani
Patrick Jaillet

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cengin_fac
Part of the Civil and Environmental Engineering Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Figliozzi, M., Mahmassani, H. S., & Jaillet, P. (2007). Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems.
Transportation Science, 41(3), 302-318.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Civil and
Environmental Engineering Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar.
Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

informs
Vol. 41, No. 3, August 2007, pp. 302–318
issn 0041-1655  eissn 1526-5447  07  4103  0302

®

doi 10.1287/trsc.1070.0193
© 2007 INFORMS

Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems
Miguel Andres Figliozzi

Faculty of Economics and Business, Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies, University of Sydney,
Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia, miguel@itls.usyd.edu.au

Hani S. Mahmassani

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Martin Hall, University of Maryland, College Park,
College Park, Maryland 20742, masmah@umd.edu

Patrick Jaillet

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139-4307, jaillet@mit.edu

T

he principal focus of this paper is to study carrier pricing decisions for a type of vehicle routing problems
deﬁned in a competitive and dynamic environment. This paper introduces the vehicle routing problem in
a competitive environment (VRPCE) as an extension of the traveling-salesman problem with proﬁts (TSPP) to
a dynamic competitive auction environment. In the VRPCE, the carrier must estimate the incremental cost of
servicing new service requests as they arrive dynamically. The paper presents a rigorous and precise treatment
of the sequential pricing and costing problem that a carrier faces in such an environment. The sequential pricing
problem presented here is an intrinsic feature of a sequential auction problem. In addition to introducing the
formulation of this class of problems and discussing the main sources of difﬁculty in devising a solution, a
simple example is constructed to show that carriers’ prices under ﬁrst-price auction payment rules do not necessarily reﬂect the cost of servicing transportation requests. An approximate solution approach with a ﬁnite rolling
horizon is presented and illustrated through numerical experiments, in competition with a static approach with
no look-ahead.
Key words: freight transportation; dynamic vehicle routing; carrier ﬂeet management strategies; pricing; carrier
proﬁtability; bidding strategies; auctions; electronic commerce
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Introduction

search, communication, quote request/preparation,
and monetary exchanges. Ubiquitous and reliable
communication networks are allowing physical decentralization of decision-making processes while
connecting market agents in real time. As transaction
time, cost, and effort reductions take place, sourcing
and procurement strategies adjust to the new market environment (Dai and Kauffman 2002). The side
effect of cheaper and improved market information,
as well as higher transparency, can lead to increased
competition (Zhu 2004). Nandiraju and Regan (2005)
present a review of transportation marketplaces and
their characteristics.
In a competitive transportation market, carriers typically face two distinct, although interrelated, decision
problems: (1) a cost minimization problem (operating the ﬂeet in the most efﬁcient manner) and (2) an
incremental cost and price determination problem
(needed for contract tendering). The ﬁrst type of problem is best described in the operations research (OR)
literature by the family of problems widely known
as vehicle routing problems (VRP). The second type
of problem, despite its signiﬁcance in competitive

The principal focus of this paper is carrier pricing
decisions for a new type of vehicle routing problems deﬁned in a competitive and dynamic environment. This class of problems is best introduced in the
context of the evolution of the freight transportation
industry (deregulation) in the ’80s and the explosive
growth of the information and communication industries in the ’90s.
The transportation industry became highly competitive in the United States after the U.S. Congress
passed motor carrier deregulation legislation in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, competition in
the trucking industry is ﬁerce, aided by relatively low
capital entry requirements (especially in the truckload (TL) sector), and reﬂected in the large number of
trucking companies (Coyle, Bardi, and Novac 2000).
Operating ratios as tight as 0.95 (allowing just ﬁve
cents per dollar earned to cover ﬁxed costs, interest
cost, and return to owners/taxes) are considered standard for TL companies (TCA 2003).
Information and communication technologies (ICT)
are reducing pre- and posttransaction costs such as
302
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markets, has not received as much attention in the
OR and vehicle routing literature, but is gaining traction in the operations management literature under
the growing subarea of revenue management.
To study carriers’ pricing in a competitive transportation market, this paper introduces the vehicle routing
problem in a competitive environment (VRPCE) as
an extension of the traveling-salesman problem with
proﬁts (TSPP) to a dynamic competitive auction environment. In the VRPCE, the carrier must estimate the
incremental cost of servicing new service requests as
they arrive dynamically. The paper presents a rigorous and precise treatment of the sequential pricing
and costing problem that a carrier faces in such an
environment. The sequential pricing problem is an
intrinsic feature of a sequential auction problem. In
addition to introducing the formulation of this class
of problems and discussing the main sources of difﬁculty in devising a solution, a simple example is constructed to show that carriers’ prices under ﬁrst-price
auction payment rules do not necessarily reﬂect the
cost of servicing transportation requests. An approximate solution approach with a ﬁnite look-ahead horizon is presented and illustrated through numerical
experiments, in competition with a static approach
with no look-ahead.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1
presents a literature review of the relevant VRP literature. Section 2 describes the VRPCE and introduces
the mathematical notation necessary to describe the
problem. Mathematical properties of pricing inherent
to the VRPCE are shown and discussed in §3. Section 4 illustrates the equations and calculation process
for a VRPCE example. Section 5 considers pricing
with alternative payment (reward) mechanisms. Section 6 discusses the computational complexity of the
VRPCE, proposes a simpliﬁed heuristic procedure,
and analyzes its properties via simulation results.
Section 7 reviews key informational and behavioral
assumptions of the VRPCE, and is followed by concluding comments in a ﬁnal section.

1.

VRP Background Review

This section places the VRPCE in the context of the
main known classes of the VRP and does not provide a comprehensive review of the extensive literature related to the VRP.
First introduced by Dantzig and Ramser (1959) in
what they called the truck-dispatching problem, the
VRP was formulated as an offshoot of the travelingsalesman problem (TSP) to capture multiple vehicles
(with and without capacity constraints) and routes.
Among many other extensions, the time windows
VRP is widely encountered (Solomon and Desrosiers
1988). The objective in that case is to build up

303

routes that minimize total distance while satisfying
all customers’ time windows. Other extensions include heterogeneous ﬂeet capacity, compatibility constraints between vehicles/cargo/customers, pickup
and delivery problems, several depots, driver-related
constraints (maximum number of driving hours or
mandatory rests), and generalized cost functions
(combination of distance, time driven, and vehicle
type). A thorough and comprehensive review of deterministic and static problems can be found in Toth
and Vigo (2002).
Problems where customers (demand) or travel (service) times are not deterministic give rise to stochastic versions of the VRP. Jaillet (1988) introduced
the a priori solution approach to the probabilistic
TSP with stochastic customer requests (when the
truck leaves the depot, there is uncertainty regarding what set of customers have to be served), later
generalized to the VRP with stochastic customers
and demand (Gendreau, Laporte, and Seguin 1996;
Bertsimas, Jaillet, and Odoni 1990; Jaillet and Odoni
1988). Stochastic travel times in vehicle routing problems were introduced in Stewart and Golden (1983)
and analyzed further in Laporte, Louveaux, and
Mercure (1992) under general stochastic programming formulations (e.g., using chance constraints).
Laporte and Louveaux (1993) presented an L-shaped
solution for the stochastic integer program with complete recourse and ﬁrst-stage binary variables.
Powell, Jaillet, and Odoni (1995) present a discussion of dynamic network modeling problems that
arise in logistics and distribution systems, including a priori optimization and online decision policies
for dynamic vehicle routing problems where information about customers or the system is revealed
over time. Powell developed early models for the
dynamic VRP (Powell 1986, 1987). Recent contributions to this problem include: approaches to anticipate
future events using multiple-scenario analysis (Bent
and Van Hentenryck 2004), sampling future scenarios (Mitrovic-Minic, Krishnamurthi, and Laporte 2004;
Hvattum, Lokketangen, and Laporte 2006), vehicle
waiting strategies (Branke et al. 2005; Mitrovic-Minic
and Laporte 2004), anticipation of customer requests
using a Markov process approach (Thomas and White
2004), and using knowledge about future demand
arrivals in a real-time setting (Hemert and La Poutre
2004; Ichoua, Gendreau, and Potvin 2006).
Dynamic ﬂeet management problems where the decision variables are assignment of vehicles (resources)
to shipments (tasks) have also been studied in the literature, e.g., Powell’s (1996) model for the dynamic
assignment problem. Recent work has focused on
studying the properties of these assignment models as
well reducing the required computational effort, e.g.,
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through approximations to the concave dynamic program value function (Topaloglu and Powell 2003). The
effectiveness and computational complexity of the
approximations are problem dependent. For example, problems with homogeneous vehicle types and
one-period shipment service times can be efﬁciently
approximated with a piecewise-linear function that
provides integer solutions (Godfrey and Powell 2002),
whereas problems with heterogeneous vehicle types
and multiperiod service times require more elaborate
approaches (Topaloglu and Powell 2002).
A common objective found throughout the literature is to minimize transportation costs, generally in
regard to empty distance, driving time, or a combination of distance and time. Although costing is part of
any dynamic problem (costs are implicitly considered
because current decisions affect the cost of serving
future shipments), costing and pricing are usually not
an explicit part of VRP (deterministic, stochastic, or
dynamic) formulations.
Proﬁts are explicitly considered in the “TravelingSalesman Problem with Proﬁts” or TSPP, as stated
by Feillet, Dejax, and Gendreau (2005) in a comprehensive survey. These TSPP problems can be
divided into three categories according to Feillet,
Dejax, and Gendreau (2005): (a) proﬁt tour problems
(PTP), (b) orienteering problems (OP), and (c) prizecollecting TSPs (PCTSP). These problems not only
include a known proﬁt for visiting a customer/city,
but also relax the condition that every customer must
be visited. In the PTP (Dell’Amico, Mafﬁoli, and
Värbrand 1995), the objective is to ﬁnd a TSP tour that
maximizes total collected proﬁts minus travel costs.
The OP (Golden, Levy, and Vohra 1987) is similar
to the PTP, with a constraint on total travel or cost.
Finally, the PCTSP (Balas 1989) is similar to the PTP,
but with a constraint on the amount of proﬁt that
must be collected in a tour.
Another line of research that explicitly includes
proﬁts and routing problems is the work on sequential auctions for transportation, where contracts (shipments) dynamically arrive at a marketplace and
carriers compete for them in a sequence of oneshipment auctions. These sequential auctions enable
the sale of cargo capacity based mainly on price,
yet still satisfy customer level of service demands.
This work belongs to this line of research. Figliozzi,
Mahmassani, and Jaillet (2003a) present a framework to study transportation marketplaces and to
compare the competitiveness of different vehicle routing strategies. Using this framework, Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet (2004) compare four different
methods to estimate service costs, including a simple
look-ahead heuristic that averages the cost of serving future requests. Subsequent work in Figliozzi,
Mahmassani, and Jaillet (2005) studies the effect of
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bid learning mechanisms and auction settings on
the performance of the transportation marketplace,
highlighting the effect on market performance of the
information known by the carriers at the time of
bidding. More recently, Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and
Jaillet (2006) introduce the concept of opportunity
costs in truckload sequential auctions, propose an
expression to quantify and approximate such opportunity costs, and discuss initial simulation results.
In his doctoral dissertation, Figliozzi (2004) suggests a game-theoretic equilibrium formulation of
the decision problems faced by the carriers (bidders) and, recognizing the intractability of that formulation, proposes a bounded rationality approach
to study carriers’ behavior and bidding. The present
paper formalizes and further develops the ideas in
Figliozzi’s dissertation and in Figliozzi, Mahmassani,
and Jaillet (2006) to present a precise treatment of
the sequential pricing problem and its related behavioral and informational assumptions. Results related
to the relative magnitude and impact of future proﬁts
in relation to static insertion costs are estimated and
discussed. Finally, note that work related to combinatorial auctions (rather than the sequential bid decisions in the present work) in transportation can be
found in Caplice (1996), Shefﬁ (2004), Song and Regan
(2005), and Wang and Xia (2005).
The VRPCE introduced in this paper generalizes
the TSPP to a dynamic environment, and presents
a rigorous and precise treatment of the sequential
pricing and costing problem that a carrier faces in a
dynamic environment. The sequential pricing problem presented here is an intrinsic feature of a sequential auction problem, which also typically includes
beyond pricing and costing, strategic game-theoretic
elements that are needed to represent a general auction process.

2.

VRPCE Conceptual Description
and Mathematical Framework

The VRPCE is an extension of TSPP problems to
a dynamic environment where customer arrivals/
characteristics have some degree of uncertainty and
the service cost must be estimated before the carrier
decides to serve or compete for an arriving request.
There are ﬁve main characteristics of a VRPCE:
(a) the vehicle routing problem is dynamic, i.e., service requests/contracts arrive over time; (b) there
is a degree of uncertainty about customer requests,
arrival times, and characteristics; (c) carriers must
dynamically estimate the incremental cost or price
of servicing a new request/contract; (d) each service
provided has a monetary reward that is uncertain at
the time of estimating the cost; and (e) the carrier’s
proﬁt depends on the reward obtained and on how
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effectively the ﬂeet is managed (service/travel costs
or resources spent to service customers).
The VRPCE is a variation of the VRP because service costs are route and schedule dependent (a). The
type of VRP (capacitated, with time windows, etc.)
is not essential in the general formulation for the
VRPCE presented in this paper, although it is highly
relevant when the speciﬁc routing problems have to
be solved (§6). The problem is essentially dynamic
and stochastic (b), otherwise the problem is a version of the already mentioned static TSPP. The accuracy needed to estimate service costs or prices (c)
depends on whether the reward (d) to be obtained
is known (acceptance/rejection problem) or unknown
(cost/pricing problem). Known-reward problems can
be easier to solve because establishing lower/upper
bounds can be computationally simpler. Regarding
rewards (e), the VRPCE is similar to the PTP, but
the rewards are unknown for requests that have not
been yet awarded (the rewards depend on competitors’ prices as in second-price auctions).
Consider a carrier in a transportation marketplace
where the carrier has to prevail in price to acquire the
right to serve any given shipper. Shippers announce
contracts on an ongoing basis. Each contract may consist of one or several shipments that the chosen carrier
will have to serve; only one price can be submitted as
a bid per contract.1
Let the contract arrival/announcement epochs be
t1  t2      tN , such that 0 < t1 and ti < ti+1 . We assume
that contracts are tendered and awarded in real time,
thus precluding carriers from pricing more than one
contract at the same time. Let tj represent the time
when contract sj arrives and the carrier tenders a
price bj ∈ R, where R is the set of real numbers.
After each contract offering, the carrier receives feedback yj regarding the outcome of the offering. The
public information known at the time of the offering for contract sj is hj = h0  y1  y2      yj−1 , where
h0 denotes the information known by all carriers at
time t0 = 0 (with t0 < t1 ) before bidding for contract s1 . Similarly, the information known at a time t
with tj−1 < t ≤ tj is ht = h0  y1  y2      yj−1 ). Again, the
information hj+1 = h0  y1  y2      yj−1  yj ) is assumed
known at any time t with tj < t ≤ tj+1 , and so on. The
amount and quality of feedback information received
will depend on the particulars of the market rules, as
discussed in §7.
Arrival times and contract characteristics are not
known in advance. They are assumed to come
1
The limitation is on one price for a contract as a whole, therefore
disallowing contract splitting or combinatorial pricing. If a carrier
cannot serve a contract as speciﬁed by the shipper—for example,
a hard time window or other constraint that cannot be met due to
previously won, but not yet served, contracts—the carrier does not
participate in the tender.
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from a probability space    , with outcomes
1  2      N . Any arriving contract sj represents a
realization at time tj from the aforementioned probability space, therefore, j = tj  sj . Let s1  s2      sN 
= S be the set of arriving contracts. The number N
of future demand realizations considered by the carrier is the length of a ﬁnite rolling horizon (RH). A
ﬁnite RH is adopted due to: (a) the intractability of
the inﬁnite-horizon problem and (b) the unreliability
of demand and price forecasts associated with long
time horizons, as discussed in §7.2 The level of carrier
competition is represented by a random variable ,
whose successive realizations j 1≤j≤N represent the
best prices offered by the competition and/or the
reservation prices of the shippers, whichever is least,
during the N successive contract offerings. If a request
or contract cannot be served and is rejected (all bids
above the reservation price), the request is assumed
to be served by alternative means. The carrier gains
the right to serve contract sj if bj < j ; if bj = j , contract sj is assumed to be awarded to the carrier with
some known probability.3
A central assumption of this VRPCE formulation is
that the carrier believes that the future level of contract price competition is not inﬂuenced by his past,
present, or future actions (price or ﬂeet management
related). The market-clearing setup is equivalent to
the clearing rules of a sequential second-price auction,
so if the carrier wins the right to serve contract sj ,
then this carrier is paid an amount j . There are no
participation costs or penalties for losing an offering.
The ﬂeet status at time t is denoted as zt , which
comprises two different sets: the set of vehicles with
their status updated to time t and the set of contracts acquired, but not yet served, up to time t. The
ﬂeet status at time tj when contract sj arrives will be
denoted as zj . Note that the set zj does not include
information on the just-arrived contract sj . Let Ij be
the indicator variable for shipment sj , such that Ij = 1
if the carrier has secured the offering for contract sj
and Ij = 0 otherwise. As contracts are tendered and
awarded in real time, the status of the ﬂeet updated
with the tender result is denoted zj  Ij . To shorten
notation, a superscript “1” will indicate that the contract was won; a superscript “0” indicates that the
contract was lost. Then, the updated states are z1j = zj 
Ij = 1 and z0j = zj  Ij = 0, respectively. If a carrier is
2
The carrier’s optimal choice of N must balance the costs associated
with data collection, computation, and forecasting reliability. This
is a complex problem in itself, and beyond the scope of this paper.
Alternatively, N could be determined by a limit imposed on the
time horizon length, i.e., a carrier must return to the depot after a
predetermined number of working hours.
3
This probability will depend on market settings such as the number of competitors and the shipper’s policy regarding the assignment of contracts when the reservation price is met.

Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet: Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems

306

Transportation Science 41(3), pp. 302–318, © 2007 INFORMS

submitting a tender for contract sj at time tj , the symbol “−” is used to represent the previous successful
tender as time tj− (the last tender won by the carrier
before time tj ). For the particular case of s1 or for a
carrier with no wins up to time tj , we use t0 as the
previous successful tender. The updated ﬂeet status
immediately after winning the contract that arrived
at time tj− is denoted z1j− ; in particular if tj− = t0 then
z1j− = z0 .
It is assumed that the ﬂeet status at a given time is
a function of time, previous ﬂeet status, and history
up to the previous epoch; travel and service times are
assumed to be deterministic. This can be expressed by
assuming the existence of a state or assignment function,4 such that the status of the carrier when shipment sj arrives is zj = atj  hj  zj−1 , or in general zt =
at ht  zj  for any tj < t ≤ tj+1 .
The distance or cost incurred by the ﬂeet from
time tj up to time t using assignment function “a”

with initial status z1j is denoted da z1j  t. Let tj be
the time at which the carrier completely serves all the
contracts in z1j . Because distance (or time) costs cannot be negative, it follows that da z1j  t is a nondecreasing function. It also has constant values on the
following ranges:
—for t < tj  da z1j  t = 0,
—for t > tj  da z1j  t = da z1j  tj .
At time tj , the incremental cost of serving contract sj up to time t ≥ tj is estimated using: csj  t =
da z1j  t − da z1j−  t − da z1j−  tj . The VRPCE
consists of determining the price for each arriving
shipment sj ; this problem is analyzed in the next
section.

3.

The VRPCE

The VRPCE can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem where each stage is
deﬁned by the arrival of a new contract, price is
the decision variable, and the state transitions are
determined by the contract award and ﬂeet assignment processes. In this section we assume that a ﬂeet
deployment process can only be changed or interrupted by winning a new contract. In particular, at
time tj , the full incremental cost of serving contract sj
is denoted as5
csj  = csj tj  = daz1j tj −daz1j− tj −daz1j− tj 
=

da z1j  tj  − da z0j  tj 

Because the VRPCE is a stochastic dynamic programming problem, we could solve it using backward
induction. The carrier pricing the last contract sN at
time tN is in a situation strategically similar to a oneitem second-price auction because: (a) the carrier’s
reward depends on the realization of the price competition for contract sj , which is j ; (b) this reward j
is independent of any action taken by the carrier;
and (c) the carrier wins the right to serve contract sj
if bj < j . If bj = j , the right to serve the contract
is obtained with a known probability dependent on
market settings, but independent of the value bj .
In a one-item second-price auction, the value of
the item (to a particular bidder) is a weakly dominant strategy. This value (cost in a reverse auction) is
the bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected proﬁt
(Vickrey 1961). Applying this logic to a reverse auction in the VRPCE setting, the cost of the contract is a
weakly dominant strategy. This cost is the price that
maximizes the carrier’s expected proﬁt. Therefore, the
price for sN that maximizes the carrier’s expected
proﬁt is bN∗ = csN . Note that at time tN the effect of
previous actions b1      bN −1  is summarized in the
state variable z0N , i.e., the cost of previous actions in
the time interval t1      tN  is already a “sunk” cost
and should not be considered again at time tN .
The carrier pricing the contract sN −1 is not in a
situation strategically similar to a one-item secondprice auction because the submitted price bN −1 has an
impact on the future status of the carrier at time tN ,
and therefore may affect the proﬁt obtained for contract sN . After submitting bN −1 there are only two possible outcomes: (1) the rights for contract sN −1 are
acquired; or (2) the rights are lost. If the former is
true, the carrier’s status at time tN will be zN  z1N −1 =
atN  hN  z1N −1 . If the latter is true, the carrier’s status
at time tN will be zN  z0N −1 = atN  hN  z0N −1 . Deﬁning
I −1
N sN  zNN−1
 as the expected proﬁts from contract sN
conditional on the previous outcome as
N sN  z1N −1  = N sN  IN −1 = 1
= EN  E  − csN   z1N −1 IN 
IN = 1

if  > bN∗  IN −1 = 1

IN = 0

if  < bN∗  IN −1 = 1

or
N sN  z0N −1  = N sN  IN −1 = 0
= EN  E  − csN   z0N −1 IN 

4

The assignment function is problem dependent; it can be any algorithm that the carrier uses to solve the corresponding routing problem and to estimate future ﬂeet status.
5

In general, earlier deployment schedules with fewer contracts ﬁnish earlier. It is assumed without loss of generality that tj ≥ tj− , the
completion time of tj stochastically dominates tj− , otherwise this
expression should be used with tj replaced by tj = maxtj  tj− .

and

IN = 1

if  > bN∗  IN −1 = 0

IN = 0

if 

< bN∗

and

 IN −1 = 0

If contract sN −1 is acquired, the carrier’s ﬂeet will
not necessarily travel a distance equivalent to the
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Ij

myopic incremental cost csN −1  because the possible
arrival and acquisition of contract sN may cut short
the ﬂeet’s deployment plan, implemented at time
tN −1 . The optimal price bN∗ −1 that maximizes the carrier’s expected proﬁts from time tN −1 onward is

where j+1 sj+1  zj  is deﬁned as the expected profits from contract sj+1 onward and conditional on the
previous outcome as

bN∗ −1 ∈ argmaxE  −csN −1 IN −1 +N sN  z1N −1 IN −1

= Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z1j Ij+1 + j+2 sj+2  z1j+1 Ij+1

j+1 sj+1  z1j 

+ N sN  z0N −1 1 − IN −1 
b ∈ R

IN −1 = 1

if  > b

and

IN −1 = 0

+ j+2 sj+2  z0j+1 1 − Ij+1  (2)
if  < b

Similarly, after submitting bN −2 there are only two
possible outcomes: (1) the rights for contract sN −2 are
acquired, or (2) the rights are lost. If the former is
true, the carrier’s status at time tN −1 will be zN −1 
z1N −2 . If the latter is true, the carrier’s status at time
I −2
 as
tN −1 will be zN −1  z0N −2 . Deﬁning N −1 sN −1  zNN−2
the expected proﬁts from contract sN −1 onward conditional on the previous outcome as

Ij+1 = 1

Ij+1 = 0

= EN −1  E 

+ N sN  z1N −1 IN −1

+ N sN  z0N −1 1 − IN −1 
IN −1 = 1

if  > bN∗ −1  IN −2 = 1

IN −1 = 0

if 

< bN∗ −1

and

 IN −2 = 1

and
N −1 sN −1  z0N −2 
= EN −1  E  − csN −1   z0N −2 IN −1 + N sN  z1N −1 IN −1
+ N sN  z1N −1 1 − IN −1 
IN −1 = 1

if  > bN∗ −1  IN −2 = 0

= Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z0j Ij+1 + j+2 sj+2  z1j+1 Ij+1
+ j+2 sj+2  z0j+1 1 − Ij+1  (3)
Ij+1 = 1

bN∗ −2

∈ arg max E 

− csN −2 IN −2 + N −1 sN −1  z1N −2 

IN −2 = 1

if  > b

and

IN −2 = 0

if  < b

bj∗

that maximizes
Using induction, the optimal price
the carrier’s expected proﬁts from time tj onward is
bj∗ ∈ arg max E  − csj Ij + j+1 sj+1  z1j Ij
+ j+1 sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij  (1)
b ∈ R

Ij = 1

if  > b

and

Ij = 0

if  < b

and

∗
if  < bj+1
 Ij = 0

3.1. Solving for the Optimal Price in the VRPCE
Neither Equation (2) nor Equation (3) is affected by
the bid value for shipment sj ; they are simply conditioned on the outcome of the tender for sj . The
expected value of the present plus future proﬁts for
any bid b ∈ R can be expressed as
E  − csj Ij + j+1 sj+1  z1j Ij + j+1 sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij 


=
 − csj p d +
j+1 sj+1  z1j p d
b



b

b

j+1 sj+1  z0j p d

−

(4)

The ﬁrst two integrals are evaluated in the interval
b  because they equal zero as long as price b is
greater than the competitors’ prices, or equivalently, if
the contract sj is lost. The last integral is evaluated in
the interval −  b because it is zero only when the
bid b is smaller than the competitors’ bids, or equivalently, if the contract sj is won.6 Grouping terms in (4):


 − csj p d +

b

·IN −2 + N −1 sN −1  z0N −2 1 − IN −2 
b ∈ R

∗
if  > bj+1
 Ij = 0

Ij+1 = 0

+

Note (again) that at time tN −1 the effect of previous actions b1      bN −2  is summarized in the state
variable z0N −1 , i.e., the cost of previous actions in the
time interval t1      tN −1  is already a sunk cost and
should not be considered again at time tN −1 . The optimal price bN∗ −2 that maximizes the carrier’s expected
proﬁts from time tN −2 onward is

∗
if  < bj+1
 Ij = 1

j+1 sj+1  z0j 

and

if  < bN∗ −1  IN −2 = 0

IN −1 = 0

and

and

N −1 sN −1  z1N −2 
− csN −1   z1N −2 IN −1

∗
if  > bj+1
 Ij = 1

+
=


b

+



b

−


b

j+1 sj+1  z1j p d

j+1 sj+1  z0j p d

 − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j p d

−

j+1 sj+1  z0j p d

(5)

6
Appendix 1 considers the case where pb =  is not negligible
(e.g., the price function is a probability mass function). The derivation is somewhat different, but the optimal price has the same
expression in both cases.
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The term
−csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j 
does not depend on the realization of  or the value
of b. Denoting cj∗ = csj  − j+1 sj+1  z1j  + j+1 sj+1  z0j 
and replacing in (4):
E  − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  + j+1 sj+1  z0j 

= j+1 sj+1  z0j  +
 − cj∗ p d
(6)
b

Equation (6) is strategically equivalent to a secondprice auction, where  represents the distribution
of the best competitors’ prices and cj∗ is the carrier’s cost. The price that maximizes Equation (6) is
simply cj∗ ; the proof that cj∗ is optimal parallels the
proof for the one-item second-price auction. Assuming b > cj∗ , then

b

 − cj∗ p d ≤


b

+
=

 − cj∗ p d


b

cj∗



 − cj∗ p d

 − cj∗ p d

cj∗

because all the elements in the last integral are equal
or larger than zero. Assuming b < cj∗ , then

cj∗

 − cj∗ p d ≥


cj∗

+
=


b

 − cj∗ p d

b

cj∗

 − cj∗ p d

 − cj∗ p d

because in the last integral the term  − cj∗ is negative,
whereas the other multiplicands are equal to or larger
than zero. Therefore, Equation (6) is maximized when
b = cj∗ , so the optimal bid for a shipment sj is
cj∗ = csj  − j+1 sj+1  z1j  + j+1 sj+1  z0j 

projection of a schedule into the future. The cost
provided by csj  is the incremental cost for incorporating sj into the carrier schedule. Equation (7) represents the value of the best price for a contract given
a carrier’s assignment technology “a.” Therefore, a
carrier with a different ﬂeet assignment method may
have a different value for the optimal bid (even if
both carriers have the same ﬂeet status). The intuition
behind (7) is straightforward. The ﬁrst term represents the “incremental cost” of serving contract sj . The
other two terms are linked to the future and are best
interpreted together as the change in future proﬁts
or opportunity costs brought about by serving contract sj . This is illustrated in a simple example in the
next section.

4.

VRPCE Example

This section illustrates how the concepts and formulas
derived in §3 apply to a simple yet instructive example. Consider a single truck that serves a square
region ABCD. Only two types of contracts are possible: carrying a load from A to B (contract AB) or
from D to A (contract DA), as illustrated in Figure 1.
A contract arrives at each unit of time; there are no
uncertainties about the arrival times, only about the
contract characteristics,  = AB DA and pAB =
pDA = 05. The distances are Manhattan (metric 1),
and there are no repositioning costs associated with
the ﬁnal location of the truck. Each contract must
be fully served within three units of time following
its arrival (time window). The truck travels with a
unit speed; therefore, in a unit of time the truck covers a distance equivalent to a side of the square. There
is a probability mass function for the “competition
prices:” p = 1 = 1/4, p = 2 = 1/2, and p = 3 =
1/4. The carrier assignment function is such that the
truck travels the shortest path necessary to serve all
outstanding (not yet fully served) contracts. The execution of a shortest path (deployment plan) can only
B

C

A

D

(7)

In a one-item second-price auction, the optimal bid
is equivalent to the value of the item, at a price such
that the bidder is indifferent between accepting or
rejecting the item. Applying the same logic, a carrier’s
cost of serving a contract is equal to the price that
maximizes the carrier’s proﬁt—in the assumed marketplace and given a carrier’s assignment function
and status—the value is provided by Equation (7).
Equations (2) and (3) show the recursive and exponential nature of the problem. The assignment function zt = at ht  zj−1  is the rule used to obtain a
carrier’s status when a new shipment arrives, or a

Lengths
|AB | = |BC | = |CD| = | DA| = 1

s1

s2

s3

sN–2 sN–1 sN

t1

t2

t3

tN–2

1

Figure 1

1

tN–1
1

tN
1

Example: Square Service Region, Two Types of Contracts,
and Constant Deterministic Contract Arrival Rate
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be interrupted or modiﬁed by the acquisition of future
contracts.
To illustrate the concepts and formulas, let us initially assume that the truck is located at vertex A at
time tN and has no outstanding (remaining) contracts
to serve. If contract AB arrives at time tN and the
carrier status is zN = A, the price is simply the full
incremental cost bN sN = AB = 1; for contract DA and
zN = A the price is simply bN sN = DA = 2.
Assume that the truck is located at vertex A at time
tN −1 and has no outstanding (remaining) contracts to
serve with corresponding zN −1 = A. If contract AB
arrives at time tN −1 and the carrier status is zN −1 = A,
the price is
bN −1 sN −1 = AB = csN −1  − N sN  z1N −1 
+ N sN  z0N −1 
The incremental cost in this case is
csN −1 = AB = da z1N −1  tN −1  − da z0N −1  tN −1 
= 1 − 0 = 1
The term N sN  z1N −1  is calculated, taking into account that z1N −1 = A AB and the future status is
going to be zN = B, then csN = AB  zN = B = 2
and csN = DA  zN = B = 3. For the case where
csN = AB  zN = B = 2 = bN , the expected proﬁt at
time tN is calculated as
E  − csN = AB  zN = BIN 
= E  − bN  zN = BIN  = 3 − 21/4 = 1/4
Only one term is needed, because the arrival of contract sN will not produce any proﬁts for price realizations  ≤ bN = 2 = csN = AB  zN = B. For the case
where csN = DA  zN = B = 3 = bN , the expected
proﬁt at time tN is simply zero because all possible prices are less than or equal to three. The term
N sN  z1N −1  is then estimated as
N sN  z1N −1 

= EN  E 

− csN   z1N −1 IN 

= 1/21/4 = 1/8
The term N sN  z0N −1  is calculated, taking into
account that z0N −1 = A and the future status is going
to be zN = A; then csN = AB  zN = A = 1 = bN and
csN = DA  zN = A = 2 = bN . For the former cost the
expected proﬁt is
E  − csN = AB  zN = AIN 
= 3 − 11/4 + 2 − 11/2 = 1
For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E  − csN = DA  zN = AIN  = 3 − 21/4 = 1/4

The term N sN  z0N −1  is estimated as
N sN  z1N −1  = EN  E  − csN   z0N −1 IN 
= 1/21 + 1/21/4 = 5/8
The optimal price for sN −1 = AB with zN −1 = A is
calculated as
bN −1 sN −1 = AB = csN −1 −N sN  z1N −1+N sN  z0N −1
= 1 − 1/8 + 5/8 = 3/2
Assume that the truck is located at vertex A at
time tN −1 with zN −1 = A. If contract DA has arrived
at time tN −1 and the carrier status is zN −1 = A, the
price is
bN −1 sN −1 = DA = csN −1 −N sN  z1N −1 +N sN  z0N −1 
The incremental cost in this case is obtained using
csN −1 = DA  zN −1 = A
= da z1N −1  tN −1  − da z0N −1  tN −1  = 2 − 0 = 2
The term N sN  z1N −1  is calculated taking into
account that z1N −1 = A$ DA and the future status is
going to be zN = D$ DA. In the case where there is an
outstanding contract, the incremental cost of serving a
just-arrived contract sN up to time t ≥ tN is estimated
using
csN  t = da z1N  tN  − da z0N  tN 
but the second term is not zero. In particular, for
csN = AB  zN = D$ DA and csN = DA  zN =
D$ DA, the incremental costs for the last arriving
contract are calculated as follows:
csN = AB  zN = D DA
= da z1N  tN  − da z0N  tN  = 2 − 1 = 1
csN = DA  zN = D DA
= da z1N  tN  − da z0N  tN  = 1 − 1 = 0
In the last expression it is implicitly assumed that the
truck capacity is sufﬁcient to carry two contract cargos
simultaneously. The future expected proﬁts are
E  − csN = AB  zN = D$ DAIN 
= 3 − 11/4 + 2 − 11/2 = 1
E  − csN = DA  zN = D$ DAIN 
= 3 − 01/4 + 2 − 01/2 + 1 − 01/4 = 2
The term N sN  z1N −1  is estimated as
N sN  z1N −1  = EN  E  − csN   z1N −1 IN 
= 1/21 + 1/22 = 3/2
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The term N sN  z0N −1  is calculated taking into
account that z0N −1 = A and the future status is going
to be zN = A, then csN = AB  zN = A = 1 and
csN = DA  zN = A = 2. For the former cost the
expected proﬁt is
E  − csN = ABIN  = 3 − 11/4 + 2 − 11/2 = 1
For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E  − csN = DAIN  = 3 − 21/4 = 1/4
The term N sN  z0N −1  is then estimated as
N sN  z1N −1  = EN  E  − csN   z0N −1 IN 
= 1/21 + 1/21/4 = 5/8
Then, the optimal price for sN −1 = AB with zN −1 = A
is calculated as
bN −1 sN −1 = AB = c̄sN −1 −N sN  z1N −1 +N sN  z0N −1 
= 2 − 3/2 + 5/8 = 9/8
This simple example illustrates the importance of
properly estimating contract costs in a VRPCE environment. Obviously, contract AB deploys the truck
in an unfavorable position, whereas contract DA
deploys the truck in a highly favorable position.
This is reﬂected in the prices starting from point A
and with no outstanding contracts: bN sN = AB = 1
and bN −1 sN −1 = AB = 3/2 (price goes up); bN sN =
DA = 2 and bN −1 sN −1 = DA = 9/8 (price goes down).
Not only is the price change sign different, but also the
magnitude of the change is such that there is an order
reversal if contracts are sorted (ascending or descending price order) at times tN −1 and tN .
This example also shows the importance of opportunity costs. There are two elements that could
increase the appeal of serving contract DA over contract AB: (1) better deployment that reduces future
incremental costs, and (2) the fact that two contracts
can be served simultaneously. Note that in all cases
the location of the truck was assumed to be at the
same vertex A initially. Appendix 3 shows the application of ﬁrst-price auction payment rules to the same
example; the results are remarkably different as illustrated in the next section and Appendix 3.

5.

Other Payment Mechanisms

Altering the payment rules can signiﬁcantly simplify
or complicate the pricing problem. The former situation occurs if the reward for contract sj becomes
known at the time of arrival; the latter situation occurs
if the reward is a function of the submitted price.
These two situations are described next.

5.1. Acceptance/Rejection Problems
If the reward for contract sj becomes known at the
time of arrival, then the VRPCE problem becomes a
dynamic acceptance/rejection problem. Let us denote
j as the reward for contract sj . Equation (1) can be
transformed into an acceptance/rejection threshold
because there are two possible outcomes: (a) a bid
over the reward j that implies a rejection, and (b) a
bid below the reward j that implies an acceptance.
It must be remembered that in a second-price auction, a carrier’s reward is the second-best bid if the
auction is won; the acceptance/rejection problem is
equivalent to having a carrier that knows all competitors’ bids and therefore knows in advance the secondlowest bid, which is j . Then, Equation (1)
bj∗ ∈ arg max E  − csj Ij + j+1 sj+1  z1j Ij
+j+1 sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij 
b ∈ R

Ij = 1

if  > b

and

Ij = 0

if  < b

can be transformed into Equation (8), the acceptance/
rejection case:
bj∗ ∈ arg maxj − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j Ij 
j+1 sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij 
b ∈ R

Ij = 1

if j > b

and

Ij = 0

(8)
if j < b

If the bid submitted is j > b, future proﬁts are j −
csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j ; otherwise, if j < b, future proﬁts
are j+1 sj+1  z0j . Combining these proﬁts, the acceptance rule is
j ≥ csj  + j+1 sj  z0j  − j+1 sj  z1j 

(9)

Note that if there is a penalty for rejecting a contract
denoted as pj , then the acceptance rule becomes
j ≥ csj  + j+1 sj+1  z0j  − j+1 sj+1  z1j  − pj 

(10)

A dynamic acceptance/rejection problem in lessthan-truckload (LTL) transportation is studied by
Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998), whose work deals
with the distribution problem between LTL terminals
where customers request a batch of loads between different origins and destinations. The dispatcher must
dynamically accept or reject shipments and decide
on truck origin or destination movements, number
of trucks dispatched, and truck or loads assignments.
The model considers a reward for served shipments, a
constant penalty for rejected shipments, holding costs
for vehicles and loads at terminals, and transportation
costs between terminals. The problem is solved using
a continuous-time Markov decision process. Conceptually, Kleywegt and Papastavrou’s (1998) work is
the closest to an acceptance/rejection VRPCE because
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request characteristics and rewards come from a
known probability distribution and become known
at the time of the request’s arrival. However, the
underlying problem is not a VRP, but a dynamic
assignment-dispatching problem between a ﬁxed set
of origin-destination pairs. Equation (10) is equivalent
to the optimal acceptance rule derived by Kleywegt
and Papastavrou (1998) for the dynamic dispatching
policies in an LTL problem.
5.2. First-Price Auction Payments
If the reward obtained for acquiring the right to serve
a contract is the price submitted itself (reward bj if
contract sj is won), the carrier pricing problem in the
last contract sN is no longer in a situation strategically similar to a one-item second-price auction. The
superscript “1” will be used to denote prices and
expectations that only apply to the ﬁrst-price auction
payment format.
The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected proﬁt
for the last contract is
∗

bN1 ∈ arg max E b − csN IN 
b ∈ R

IN = 1

if  > b

and

IN −1 = 0

if  < b

The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected proﬁt
for contract sN −1 is
∗

bN1 −1 ∈ arg max E b − csN −1 IN −1 + N sN  z1N −1 IN −1
+ N sN  z0N −1 1 − IN −1 
b ∈ R

IN −1 = 1

if  > b

and

IN −1 = 0

if  < b

The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected proﬁt
for contract sj is
∗

bN1 −1 ∈ arg max E b − csj Ij + N sj+1  z1j IN −1
+ N sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij  (11)
b ∈ R

Ij = 1

if  > b

and

Ij = 0

if  < b

The future expected proﬁts are calculated as follows:
1
sj+1  zIj 
j+1
∗
1
= Ej+1  E bj+1
−csj+1   zIj Ij+1 +j+2
sj+2  z1j+1 Ij+1
1
+ j+2
sj+2  z0j+1 1 − Ij+1  (12)
1
Note that in general j+1
sj+1  zIj  = j+1 sj+1  zIj . In
auction terminology, this type of payment or reward
corresponds to a ﬁrst-price auction.
In general, the price that maximizes expected profits is (derivation in Appendix 2):


∗
b − c 1∗ sj p d
b ∈ R (13)
bj1 ∈ arg max
b

1
1
where c 1∗ sj  = csj  + j+1
sj+1  z1j  − j+1
sj+1  z0j .
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Because the reward is no longer independent from
the price submitted by the carrier, expression (13)
is more involved than previously obtained expression (7). Furthermore, expression (13) indicates than
the price submitted by the carrier is not necessarily
∗
the cost of servicing the arriving shipment (c 1 sj .
This type of pricing conceals the importance of repositioning costs and truck location/status as shown in
Appendix 3; ﬁrst-price auction payments may lead to
ex ante inefﬁcient outcomes. The same phenomenon
was observed by Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet
(2005) when simulating ﬁrst and second-price auction marketplaces. After employing ﬁrst-price auction
rules in the example previously studied in §4, the
prices submitted for contract AB are: bN sN = AB =
bN −1 sN −1 = AB. This example clearly shows that
prices with ﬁrst-price auction payments do not necessarily reﬂect the cost of generating the transport
service. For all of the abovementioned reasons, a
second-price auction mechanism is employed to allocate contracts in a VRPCE.

6.

VRPCE Implementation

The numerical implementation of a VRPCE strategy
may be a difﬁcult task for large ﬂeets or a large number of contracts. Even assuming for the time being
that Sj+1N = sj+1      sN  is known at time tj , each
of the remaining N − j contracts can be won or lost,
generating a decision tree that has 2N −j end nodes
and corresponding possible future trajectories. Furthermore, one needs to consider solving an NP-hard
problem (underlying VRPs) every time csk  has to be
estimated.
A further source of difﬁculty is that the profitability of each path history up to a given time is
dependent on the value of future costs (which are
unknown when going forward). Conversely, the value
of future costs are known when moving backward,
however, one does not know the carrier’s status at the
time (a carrier’s status is dependent on the previous
path history). It is important to note that future ﬂeet
deployment depends on the present price tendered
and its probability of winning. At the same time, the
present price depends on the future proﬁts and future
ﬂeet status.
The exact or computational estimation of Equation (7) may be quite involved or even intractable for
small problems. In this section, we propose and evaluate a computationally straightforward approximation
of Equation (7). This approach is denoted herein onestep-look-ahead (1SLA) because it limits the evaluation of the future proﬁts to just one step or period
into the future:
j+1 sj+1  z1j  ≈ Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z1j Ij+1 
j+1 sj+1  z0j  ≈ Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z0j Ij+1 
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To estimate these two terms, it is assumed that the
1SLA carrier knows the true distribution of load
arrivals over time and their spatial distribution , and
also has an estimation of the endogenously generated
prices or payments ; 30 draws from  and  are
used to estimate these two terms. In this paper the
1SLA carrier approximates the price function as a normal function, whose mean and standard deviation are
obtained from the whole sample of previous prices.
The 1SLA approach uses this expression to estimate
the price:
bsj  = csj  − Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z1j Ij+1 
+ Ej+1  E  − csj+1   z0j Ij+1 
The 1SLA carrier is compared against a static
approach that does not take into account the stochastic nature of the problem. This is a natural benchmark
because it represents a myopic carrier. This is herein
denoted as the “static” approach, where the price submitted for a given shipment sj is simply csj . Simulations are used to simultaneously compare how the
1SLA and static approximations perform under different market settings (in our case limited to arrival
rates and time windows). Market and simulation settings used to quantify and compare the performance
of the two approaches are described next.
6.1. Market and Simulation Settings
The simulated market only enables the sale of truckload cargo capacity based mainly on price, yet still
satisﬁes customer level of service demands (in this
case, hard time windows or TW). The mixed-integer
program formulation used to estimate csj  is based
on the formulation proposed by Yang, Jaillet, and
Mahmassani (2004). Shipments and vehicles are fully
compatible in all cases; there are no special shipments or commodity-speciﬁc equipment. Three different TW length/shipment service duration ratios are
simulated. These ratios are denoted short, medium,
and long, a reference to the average time window
length. The different time window lengths (TWL) for
a shipment sj , where ldsj  denotes the function that
returns the distance between a shipment origin and
destination, are
• TWLsj  = 1ldsj  + 025 + uniform00 10
(short)
• TWLsj  = 2ldsj  + 025 + uniform00 20
(medium)
• TWLsj  = 3ldsj  + 025 + uniform00 30
(long).
The shipments to be auctioned are circumscribed in
a bounded geographical region. The simulated region
is a 1 by 1 square area. Trucks travel from shipment origins to destinations at a constant unit speed
(one unit distance per unit time). Shipment origins

and destinations are uniformly distributed over the
region. There is no explicit underlying network structure in the chosen origin-destination demand pattern.
Alternatively, it can be seen as a network with an inﬁnite number of origins and destinations (essentially
each point in the set 0 1 × 0 1 that has an inﬁnite
number of corresponding links. Each and every link
possesses an equal inﬁnitesimal probability of occurrence. Vehicles are assumed to travel at a constant
speed in a Euclidean two-dimensional space. Vehicles speeds are a unit; the average shipment length is
0.52. Carriers’ sole sources of revenue are the payments received when a shipment is acquired. Shippers’ reservation prices are set as 1.41 units (diagonal
of the square area) plus the loaded distance of the
shipment. Carriers’ costs are proportional to the total
distance traveled by the ﬂeet. It is assumed that all
carriers have the same unit cost per mile.
The market is comprised of shippers that independently call for shipment procurement auctions, and
two carriers. Each carrier operates two trucks. Different demand-supply ratios are studied. Arrivals in
all cases follow Poisson processes, with arrival rates
ranging from low to high. At a low arrival rate, all
the shipments can be served (if some shipments are
not serviced, it is due to a very short time window).
At a high arrival rate carriers operate at capacity and
many shipments have to be rejected. The expected
interarrival time is normalized with respect to the
market ﬂeet size. The expected interarrival times are
1/2 arrivals per unit time per truck, 2/2 arrivals per
unit time per truck, and 3/2 arrivals per unit time per
truck (low, medium, and high arrival rates, respectively). The results obtained reﬂect the steady-state
operation (1,000 arrivals and 10 iterations) of the simulated system.
Allocations follow the rules of a second-price
reverse auction. It is important to highlight that carriers are competing for each shipment or contract.
Carriers are simultaneously interacting in the same
market, which better resembles the operation of a
dynamic competitive market rather than the evaluation of each strategy separately (with no interaction)
followed by a comparison of the separately obtained
results. Simulation results that assess the quality of the
1SLA approximation in relation to the static approximation are presented next.
6.2. Analysis of Results
Tables 1 to 3 compare the results for the 1SLA carrier
versus the static carrier. Table 1 illustrates that the
1SLA carrier outperforms its competitor proﬁtwise, or
obtains a higher market share when proﬁt differences
are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2 presents the average ﬂeet utilization per
carrier (ﬂeet utilization reﬂects, on average, what percentage of the time trucks are not idle), which as
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Table 1

Proﬁt and Number of Shipments Served Comparison

Arrival
rate

TW

Low

Carrier
type

Average
proﬁt

St. dev.
proﬁt

Diff.
proﬁt (%)

Average
served

St. dev.
served

Diff.
served (%)

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

10344
9949
6385
4659
6344
3529

1.81
3.11
1.62
1.43
1.96
0.99

40

210.50
212.50
288.30
210.90
306.70
193.30

1.52
2.22
3.64
3.63
4.28
4.28

−09

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

24259
21560
16257
16332
14432
12049

3.19
3.52
3.84
3.35
3.09
2.53

366.80
394.40
515.60
459.60
576.20
420.80

3.92
2.55
2.37
2.57
4.35
4.79

−70

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

38759
33158
33755
30670
31504
31480

4.63
3.99
5.56
3.00
6.07
4.09

475.50
513.30
605.40
598.80
651.30
635.40

5.27
2.52
5.12
4.47
7.40
5.74

−74

Short
Med.
Long

Med.

Short
Med.
Long

High

Short
Med.
Long

expected increases when the number of shipments
served (Table 1) or arrival rate increases. The average
loaded distance per carrier shows a distinct pattern;
the 1SLA carrier tends to serve shorter shipments
when there is a short time window. This is an intuitive result, because shorter shipments tend to utilize
fewer resources. The difference in proﬁts and number
of shipments handled decreases percentagewise when
the arrival rate is high and the time windows are not
short. This can be explained by the fact that the 1SLA
carrier is operating at capacity. When supply is tight
all carriers tend to do well.
Table 2
Arrival
rate
Low

TW
Short

Long
Short
Med.
Long
High

798
125
−05
198
169
101
01

367
587

122
369

11
25

Table 3 shows how the 1SLA carrier modiﬁes the
static service cost per arriving shipment. The static
insertion cost is equal to csj  minus shipment sj
loaded distance (loaded distance associated costs are
equal for all carriers). With shorter time windows
prices are increased to reﬂect that it is harder to serve
additional shipments when time windows are tight;
the static approach tends to undervalue the “true” cost
of serving shipments when time windows are short.
For larger time windows (low and medium arrival
rates) prices are decreased; the static approach tends
to overvalue the true cost of serving shipments when

Fleet Utilization and Average Loaded Distance per Shipment Served Comparison

Med.

Med.

370

Short
Med.
Long

Carrier
type

Fleet
utilizat. (%)

St. dev.
ﬂeet utilizat.

Diff.
utilizat. (%)

Average
loaded dist.

St. dev.
loaded dist.

Diff. loaded
dist. (%)

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

32.60
33.97
47.07
32.98
48.85
29.80

0.0013
0.0027
0.0040
0.0025
0.0034
0.0031

−40

0.5083
0.5343
0.5265
0.5230
0.5261
0.5219

0.0045
0.0079
0.0049
0.0078
0.0050
0.0056

−49

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

57.68
62.06
80.71
71.58
86.99
61.62

0.0019
0.0035
0.0036
0.0042
0.0049
0.0057

−71

0.5089
0.5263
0.5237
0.5274
0.5246
0.5244

0.0073
0.0050
0.0077
0.0041
0.0068
0.0063

−33

1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static
1SLA
Static

74.38
80.96
95.43
93.83
97.21
92.64

0.0026
0.0029
0.0009
0.0024
0.0013
0.0031

−81

0.5087
0.5326
0.5250
0.5285
0.5269
0.5244

0.0097
0.0060
0.0050
0.0066
0.0064
0.0048

−45

427
639

128
412

17
49

07
08

−07
00

−07
05
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Table 3

Average Insertion Costs and Future Proﬁts Comparison

TW

Carrier
type

Average static
insertion cost

Average
j+1 sj+1  zj1 
(1)

Average
j+1 sj+1  zj0 
(2)

Diff.
2 − 1

2 − 1
insertion
cost (%)

Low

Short
Med.
Long

1SLA
1SLA
1SLA

0.369
0.405
0.386

0.338
0.181
0.194

0.355
0.143
0.144

0017
−0038
−0050

474
−939
−1283

Med.

Short
Med.
Long

1SLA
1SLA
1SLA

0.378
0.397
0.353

0.375
0.219
0.188

0.451
0.197
0.161

0076
−0022
−0027

2015
−552
−778

High

Short
Med.
Long

1SLA
1SLA
1SLA

0.369
0.391
0.348

0.376
0.332
0.260

0.515
0.353
0.271

0139
0021
0011

3762
532
328

Arrival rate

time windows are short. However, if the ﬂeet utilization is too high (over 90% as shown in Table 2), the
static approach tends to undervalue the true cost of
serving shipments even when time windows are long.
There are two distinct forces operating on the market prices: time window lengths and arrival rates.
The 1SLA strategy manages to outperform the static
pricing approach either proﬁtwise or with higher
market shares when proﬁts are not signiﬁcantly different. In addition, the 1SLA strategy seems able to
price discriminately by shipment characteristics (e.g.,
by the shipment loaded distance). As expected, taking the future into account outperforms the myopic
approach. The same type of results has been found in
the work of Powell, Towns, and Marar (2000); however, it is important to notice that our work deals with
pricing decisions, whereas Powell’s deals with routing or assignment decisions.

7.

Informational and Behavioral
Assumptions in the VRPCE
Problem

The formulation presented in §3 is general enough to
readily accommodate variants to the VRPCE, whereas
the solution procedures of §§ three and four still
apply. In a real-life application, the arrival rates of
contracts () and price distributions () need to be
estimated. In such cases, when carriers must work
 = f y0  y1     
with the estimated distributions, (
yj−1  and ( = gy0  y1      yj−1 , the amount of
information revealed can have a high impact on
the quality of the estimated distributions. Following
the classiﬁcation used by Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and
Jaillet (2003b), the two extremes of the information
spectrum can be denoted as: (a) a maximum information environment (MaIE) where all arrivals and
prices are revealed or (b) a minimum information
environment (MiIE) where acceptance or rejection is
the only information provided. These two extreme
scenarios approximate two realistic situations. Maximum information would correspond to a totally

transparent Internet auction where all arrival/auction
information is accessed by participants. Minimum
information would correspond to a shipper selectively telephoning carriers for a quote, with the shipper only calling back the carrier that was selected.
Some key assumptions are made in the VRPCE in
order to keep the problem not only relevant from
the economic and routing point of view, but also
tractable and conceptually well deﬁned. The assumed
price clearance rules (similar to second-price auctions) and independence (the independence assumption herein) between carrier actions and prices (or
contract arrivals) assures that a rational carrier (with
adequate computational capabilities) will only price
his services at the incremental cost provided by Equation (7). This fact is relevant because it takes away
any strategic element from the VRPCE and focuses
the attention on efﬁcient routing and costing. Computational results have also shown that the second
price with information about market-clearing prices
generates more wealth than ﬁrst-price auction clearing rules or second-price auctions with minimum
information (MiIE) (Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet
2005).
However, the “independence assumption” is a
strong assumption, especially in the full-information
case (MaIE). With full-information numerous data can
be collected by the carriers and there may exist an
incentive to use the revealed data to model how
competitors price contracts. If this takes place, a
carrier may model competitors’ behavior and add
causal links between a carrier’s actions and future
prices (Figliozzi 2004). The independence assumption
is more suitable when there is a large number of
competitors, no participation fees or rejection penalties, information about market-clearing prices, and
unconstrained capacity as the game-theoretical auction and industrial organization literature indicates
(Krishna 2002, Tirole 1989). Therefore, the independence assumption is more suitable in a truly competitive environment, hence the “CE” in VRPCE.
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8.

Conclusion

This paper presents the VRPCE, illustrated as a
dynamic extension of the traveling-salesmen problem
with proﬁts. In the VRPCE a carrier that attempts
to act rationally must estimate the incremental cost
of servicing the new service requests as they arrive
dynamically. An intuitive optimal price expression for
the VRPCE problem reveals that full incremental costs
include: (a) the expected change due to altering the
current ﬂeet assignment scheme, and (b) the opportunity costs on future proﬁts created by serving a
new contract. A simple example showed that carriers’
prices under ﬁrst-price auction payment rules do not
necessarily reﬂect the cost of servicing transportation
requests.
The proposed VRPCE problem provides an adequate framework with which to evaluate the impact
of new service arrivals or changes in the ﬂeet/
shipments status in a competitive environment. Competition may involve either (a) two or more competing (opposing) options such as accept or reject, use
private ﬂeet or use common carrier, charge price A or
charge price B, etc. or (b) a price competition with a
rival company. Pricing is explicitly incorporated into
the formulation; this is achieved by relaxing a sequential auctions mechanism to model a competitive environment that makes explicit the carriers’ behavioral
assumptions in the VRPCE problem. A simulationbased approach to evaluate service costs was proposed and evaluated; the proposed approach not only
outperforms a static pricing, but it also intuitively
price discriminates by market arrival rate, time windows, and shipment characteristics.
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Appendix 1

If the value pb =  is not negligible, and for a given constant k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, let kpb =  represent the probability of acquiring the contract when there is a price tie. For
a ) > 0 arbitrarily small, the expected value of the present
plus future proﬁts for any bid b ∈ R can be expressed as
E 

=

− csj Ij + j+1 sj+1  z1j Ij
b+)

+



 − csj p d +
b−)

−



+ j+1 sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij 

b+)

j+1 sj+1  z1j p d

j+1 sj+1  z0j pd + kp = b ∗ b − csj 

+ kp = b ∗ j+1 sj+1  z1j  + j+1 sj+1  z0j 

(A1)

The ﬁrst two integrals are evaluated in the interval
b + )  because they equal zero as long as price b is
greater than the competitors’ prices b > , or equivalently,
if the contract sj is won. The last integral is evaluated in
the interval −  b − ) because it is not zero only when the
bid b is bigger than the competitors’ bids b > , or equivalently, if the contract sj is lost. Grouping terms in (A1):

b+)

 − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j p d
+ kp = b ∗ b − csj  +


−

j+1 sj+1  z0j p d

+ kp = b ∗ j+1 sj+1  z1j  − kp = b ∗ j+1 sj+1  z0j 
Regrouping once more:

 − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j p d
b+)

+ kp = b ∗  − csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j 
+ j+1 sj+1  z0j 

(A2)

Again, the term −csj  + j+1 sj+1  z1j  − j+1 sj+1  z0j  does
not depend on the realization of  or the value of b. Denoting cj∗ = csj  − j+1 sj+1  z1j  + j+1 sj+1  z0j  and replacing
in (A2):

 − cj∗ sj p d
b+)

+ kp = b ∗  − cj∗ sj  + j+1 sj+1  z0j 

(A3)

Equation (A3) is strategically equivalent to a second-price
auction, where  represents the distribution of the best competitors’ prices and cj∗ is the carrier’s cost. The price that
maximizes Equation (A3) is simply cj∗ ; the proof that cj∗ is
optimal parallels the proof for the one-item second-price
auction. The term j+1 sj+1  z0j  is constant and may be
taken out without altering the comparisons.
Assuming b > cj∗ , then

b+)

 − cj∗ p d + kp = b ∗  − cj∗ sj 
≤


b+)

+



 − cj∗ p d + p = b − cj∗ sj 
b−)

cj∗

 − cj∗ p d

because all the elements in the last integral are equal to or
larger than zero, and p = b ≥ kp = b is also larger than
zero.
Assuming b < cj∗ , then

cj∗

 − cj∗ p d
≥


cj∗

 − cj∗ p d +



cj∗

b+)

 − cj∗ p d

+ kp = b ∗  − cj∗ sj 
because in the last integral the term  − cj∗ is negative and
in the last term kp = b ∗ b − cj∗ sj  is negative. Therefore,
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Equation (A3) is maximized when b = cj∗ . Therefore, the
optimal bid for a shipment sj is equal to (7): cj∗ = c̄sj  −
j+1 sj  z1j  + j+1 sj  z0j .

cN = 3
cN = 2

Appendix 2

 1∗ cN = 2 bN = 3 − ) = 3 − ) − 2 ∗ 1/4 ≈ 1/4

For the ﬁrst-price auction payment, the optimal price must
maximize expected proﬁts. The expected value of the
present plus future proﬁts for any bid b ∈ R can be expressed as
1
1
E b − csj Ij + j+1
sj+1  z1j Ij + j+1
sj+1  z0j 1 − Ij 


1
b − csj p d +
j+1
sj+1  z1j p d
=
b

+



b

b
−

1
j+1
sj+1

 z0j p d

+
=


b


−

 1∗ cN = 2 bN = 2 − ) = 2 − ) − 2 ∗ 1/4
+ 2 − ) − 2 ∗ 1/2 ≈ 0
cN = 1
 1∗ cN = 1 bN = 3 − ) = 3 − ) − 1 ∗ 1/4 ≈ 1/2
 1∗ cN = 1 bN = 2 − ) = 2 − ) − 1 ∗ 1/4
+ 2 − ) − 1 ∗ 1/2 ≈ 3/4

The ﬁrst two integrals are evaluated in the interval b 
because they equal zero as long as price b is greater than the
competitors’ prices b > , or equivalently, if the contract sj
is won. The last integral is evaluated in the interval −  b
because it is not zero only when the bid b is bigger than the
competitors’ bids b > , or equivalently, if the contract sj
is lost. Grouping terms:

1
1
b − csj  + j+1
sj+1  z1j  − j+1
sj+1  z0j p d
b

 1∗ cN = 3 bN = 3 = 0

1
j+1
sj+1  z0j p d

cN = 0
 1∗ cN = 0 bN = 3 − ) = 3 − ) − 0 ∗ 1/4 ≈ 3/4
 1∗ cN = 0 bN = 2 − ) = 2 − ) − 0 ∗ 1/4
+ 2 − ) − 0 ∗ 1/2 ≈ 3/2
1∗

 cN = 0bN = 1−) = 1−)−0∗1/4+1−)−0∗1/2
+ 1 − ) − 0 ∗ 1/4 ≈ 1
Then the prices for the last shipment are simply the best
responses:

1
1
b − csj  + j+1
sj+1  z1j  − j+1
sj+1  z0j p d

1
+ j+1
sj+1  z0j 

bN sN = AB csN  = 1 = 2 − )
bN sN = DA csN  = 2 = 3 − )

1∗

The last term is a constant. Replacing c sj  = csj  +
1
1
j+1
sj+1  z1j  − j+1
sj+1  z0j , the optimal bid maximizes:


∗
∗
bj1 ∈ arg max
b − c 1 sj p d
b ∈ R
b

There is no general expression for the optimal bid that is
“distribution free” and equivalent to expression (7). For
each particular distribution of prices there will be a corresponding optimal price function. For example, if prices
are uniformly distributed in the interval 0 u, the optimal
price is
u + c 1∗ sj 
bj1∗ =
for 0 ≤ c 1∗ sj  ≤ u$
2
in particular, bj1∗ = u/2 for c 1∗ sj  = 0 and bj1∗ > u for
c 1∗ sj  > u.

Appendix 3

This appendix applies ﬁrst-price auction payment mechanisms to the example presented in §5. To illustrate the concepts and formulas, let us initially assume that the truck is
originally located at vertex A. If contract AB has arrived at
time tN and the carrier status is zN = A (truck is empty
and idle).
Best responses are calculated using


1∗
1∗
bj ∈ arg max
b − c sj p d
b ∈ R
b

When the last shipment arrives, for each cost there is a price
that maximizes expected proﬁts:

Let us now assume that the truck is located at vertex A and
idle at time tN −1 , with corresponding zN −1 = A. If contract
AB has arrived at time tN −1 and the carrier status is zN −1 =
A (truck is empty and idle), the incremental cost in this
case is
csN −1 = AB = daz1N −1 tN −1 −daz0N −1 tN −1  = 1−0 = 1
The term N1 sN  z1N −1  is calculated by taking into account
that z1N −1 = A$ AB and that the future status is going to be
zN = B; then csN = AB = 2 and csN = DA = 3. For the
former cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = ABIN  = 1/4
For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = DAIN  = 0
The term N1 sN  z1N −1  is then estimated as
N1 sN  z1N −1  = EN  E bN1∗ − csN   z1N −1 IN 
= 1/21/4 + 1/20 = 1/8
The term N1 sN  z0N −1  is calculated by taking into account
that z0N −1 = A and the future status is going to be zN = A;
then, csN = AB = 1 and csN = DA = 2. For the former cost
the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = ABIN  = 3/4
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For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = DAIN  = 1/4
The term N1 sN  z0N −1  is then estimated as

The proﬁts are
2 − 11/8 ∗ 1/4 + 2 − 11/8 ∗ 1/2 = 5/32 + 10/32 = 15/32
With a price of 3 − ), proﬁts are smaller
3 − 11/8 ∗ 1/4 = 13/32

N1 sN  z1N −1  = EN  E bN1∗ − csN   z0N −1 IN 
= 1/23/4 + 1/21/4 = 1/2
Then, the cost c 1∗ sN −1  is
c 1∗ sN −1 = AB = 1 − 1/8 + 1/2 = 11/8
The best response to this cost is a price:
bN −1 sN −1 = AB = 2 − )
Let us now assume that the truck is located at vertex A
and is idle at time tN −1 with corresponding zN −1 = A. If
contract DA has arrived at time tN −1 , the carrier status is
zN −1 = A (truck is empty and idle) and the incremental
cost is in this case is
csN −1 = DA = da z1N −1  tN −1  − da z0N −1  tN −1 
= 2 − 0 = 2
The term N1 sN  z1N −1  is calculated by taking into account
that z1N −1 = A$ DA and the future status is going to be
zN = D DA; then, csN = AB = 1 and csN = DA = 0. For
the former cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = ABIN  = 3/4
For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = DAIN  = 3/2
The term N1 sN  z1N −1  is then estimated as
N1 sN  z1N −1  = EN  E bN1∗ − csN   z1N −1 IN 
= 1/23/4 + 1/23/2 = 9/8
The term N1 sN  z0N −1  is calculated by taking into account
that z0N −1 = A and the future status is going to be zN = A;
then, csN = AB = 1 and csN = DA = 2. For the former cost
the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = ABIN  = 3/4
For the latter cost the expected proﬁt is
E bN1∗ − csN = DAIN  = 1/4
The term N sN  z0N −1  is then estimated as
N1 sN  z1N −1  = EN  E bN1∗ − csN   z0N −1 IN 
= 1/23/4 + 1/21/4 = 1/2
Then, the cost c 1∗ sN −1  is
c 1∗ sN −1 = DA = 2 − 9/8 + 1/2 = 11/8
The best response to this cost is a price
bN −1 sN −1 = DA = 2 − )

This simple example illustrates the importance of the
given or assumed price distribution when payments are
similar to ﬁrst-price auction payments. This is reﬂected in
the prices starting from point A and with no outstanding contracts: bN sN = AB = 2 − ) and bN −1 sN −1 = AB =
2 − ) (price remains constant); bN sN = DA = 3 − ) and
bN −1 sN −1 = DA = 2−) (price goes down). In addition, ﬁrstprice auction payment mechanisms may lead to inefﬁcient
ex ante allocations because the carrier prices the contracts
above the marginal cost, i.e., the lowest expected cost carrier
does not serve the contract even though it would be ex ante
optimal to do so. The same phenomenon was observed by
Figliozzi, Mahmassani, and Jaillet (2005) when simulating
ﬁrst and second-price sequential auction marketplaces.
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